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THE ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
JACK MANNO* 
Abstract: Environmental laws and policies influence the direction of 
environmental science in complex ways. An emphasis on static efficie-
ncy in the design and implementation of law and policy creates 
incentives for scientists to ask questions that are narrowly focused on 
the most predictable and measurable environmental variables. Policies 
designed to protect or restore the emergent properties of ecosystems 
encourage scientists to ask questions about ecosystem dynamics and the 
relationship between human activities and the loss or degradation of 
ecosystem services. Answering such questions is essential for the ecolo-
gical sciences to advance. This essay addresses three manifestations of 
policies that can improve understanding of ecological dynamics: the 
precautionary principle, adaptive management, and the ecosystem 
approach to environmental management. 
INTRODUCTION 
Typically in environ men tal law and policymaking we ask econo-
mists to tell us if what we are considering is the most efficient use of 
scarce resources. To accomplish this, economists carry out various 
forms of comparative cost-benefit analyses in hopes of identifYing the 
most economically efficient means to a given environmental end. A 
great deal of simplification must occur to accomplish these analyses. 
Administration and compliance costs must be predicted and their costs 
estimated and compared to predicted outcomes whose value also must 
be stated in monetary terms. To reduce the uncertainty and increase 
the reliability of the results. economists must focus on those costs and 
benefits that are the most predictable and quantifiable. One result of 
this approach is to encourage environmental scientists to produce re-
sults that fit into the cost-benefit paradigm, what David Driesen calls 
"static efficiency. "1 Because of the conflict apparent in so much envi-
* Executive Director, Great Lakes Research Consortium; Adjunct Associate Professor 
in Environmental Studies, College of Environmental Science and Forestry, State University 
of New York, Syracuse, NY. 
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ronmental policymaking, stakeholders tend to challenge vigorously 
each other's assumptions and the science on which they are based. It is 
in this context that we so often hear one people's "sound science" be-
ing contrasted with their opponent's junk science. In this atmosphere, 
science, like economics, gets pulled toward caution, to focusing on the 
already known, the obvious, and the simple. Though it may be obvious 
that sound science is necessary for the development of good environ-
mental law and policy, I would argue that sound law and policy is also 
necessary for good science. The focus on static efficiency not only limits 
our ability to protect our environment effectively, it also slows the prog-
ress of the environmental sciences by creating incentives to focus on 
the kinds of simplifications most suited to efficiency analyses. 
David Driesen urges us to go beyond static efficiency to consider 
the economic dynamics of environmental law and policy, to under-
stand the effects of such laws and policies as a complex system of in-
centives and disincentives that steer economic behavior in ways that 
benefit or harm the environment. Driesen changes the economic 
question from how do we meet environmental goals in the most 
efficient manner-static-to how do we use economic dynamics to 
achieve our environmental goals. He doesn't reject static efficiency 
argumen ts, he just recognizes their limitations. 
U sing much the same logic, I argue that we also need to inform 
environmental law and policy with our best understanding of ecological 
dynamics to better understand the impacts of our actions. To under-
stand both economic and ecological dynamics requires systems think-
ing and an intellectual honesty about our ability to predict the costs 
and benefits of our laws and policies. What a focus on economic and 
ecological dynamics does, is shift society's attention toward how best to 
produce conditions in which people prosper in the least disruptive and 
most supportive ways for protecting and restoring the ecological dy-
namics of the natural systems upon which all prosperity depends. 
In this essay I address three manifestations of this focus on eco-
logical dynamics: the precautionary principle, adaptive management, 
and the ecosystem approach. These and others are ways of basing envi-
ronmentallaws and policies on ecological dynamics. In doing so, they 
encourage scientists to focus on these system dynamics rather than on 
the more mundane accounting relied on when static efficiency is the 
goal. The criticisms frequently leveled at these policies are that they are 
too complicated and the concepts on which they are based too poorly 
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defined.2 But that may be exactly why they are good for science-they 
require that we continually improve our understanding of the ecologi-
ca1 dynamics that govern the natural world. They raise bigger and bet-
ter questions. How we frame environmental policy questions has enor-
mous implications for environmenta1 science. 
I. FRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
As Walters and Holling have pointed out, the "resource managers 
will perhaps always operate in a twilight of uncertainty about the rela-
tive importance of their actions as opposed to the effects of uncon-
trolled environmental and ecological factors."3 As a result, narrowef-
forts to establish the sort of persuasive causal links between policies and 
outcomes required by cost-benefit analyses are likely to fail. The best we 
can hope for is to appraise policy options from the perspective of eco-
10gica1 dynamics. But because our ability to model complex ecosystem 
dynamics fully and to predict ecologica1 change confidently are limited, 
such appraisals are often resisted as a departure from sound science. 
As the environmenta1 philosopher Kristin Shrader-Frechette has 
argued, the types of quantification usually considered "sound science" 
and used to support environmental policies are narrow but precise, 
such as dose response relationships between animal exposure to some 
toxic chemical in a laboratory and a particular measurable health out-
come, or the relationship between water flow through a dam and elec-
tricity production and so on. The "ecological sciences," however, tend 
to be holistic and broad. 'The advantages and disadvantages of the 
animal-toxicity paradigm (of ecosystem management)" she writes, 
"stem from its being simple to use and easy to understand. "4 The prob-
lem, she points out, is that while the relationship works best for expo-
sures to single chemicals in a controlled setting, most of what typically 
stresses ecosystems are multiple stressors--chemical, physical, and bio-
logical-that never act alone in the rea1 world, an uncontrolled setting. 
Adopting an anima1-toxicity paradigm leads science to a simplification 
of the relationship between environmenta1 degradation and health, 
both human and environmental. 
2 See Wayne A. Morrissey, Science Policy and Federal Ecosystem-Based Management, 6 Eco-
LOGICAL APPLICATIONS 717, 717 (1996). 
5 Carl J. Walters & C. S. Holling, Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning by Do-
ing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060,2066 (1990). 
4 See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, What rusk Management Teaches Us About Ecosystem 
Management, 40 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLAN. 141, 143 (1998). 
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Law and policies derived from a static efficiency paradigm there-
fore lead to a science of supporting stake-claiming and case-making in a 
process where the environment is understood to be one of several in-
terests making claims on scarce resources. Treating the environment as 
an "interest" among competing interests significantly weakens the envi-
ronmental case, which is fundamentally that the need to protect the 
environment is a responsibility and a constraint on all interests that use 
the resources the environment provides. Treating the environment as 
an interest leads to the bad environmental science of defining and de-
fending the "interests" of the environment in poorly thought out 
monetary terms, or interest satisfaction curves and other overly simple 
metrics for use in multi-objective decision models. These decision-
support models are often hyped as "objective," which they are not. Em-
bedded in the structure of the model are assumptions about the inter-
ests involved and their relationships to each other. 
Law and policies derived from ecological dynamics reject the no-
tion that the environment is an "interest" making claims on resources, 
but rather, is the fundamental resource on which all economic inter-
ests depend. What needs most understanding is how to minimize the 
ways in which each interest's claims deplete and impoverish the envi-
ronment. This requires a fuller understanding of the relationship be-
tween economic and ecological dynamics. In this framework eco-
nomic development can be appraised according to whether or not it 
increases our capacity to meet human needs, while decreasing envi-
ronmentally damaging energy and material throughput. Good envi-
ronmentallaws and policies should be: 
• Based on manipulating economic dynamics in order to create 
economic incentives to decrease energy and material throughput 
and ecosystem disruptions; 
• Clear in purpose, directed to both public welfare and environ-
mental protection; 
• Preventative; 
• Adaptive, capable of change as new information and better un-
derstanding of ecological dynamics emerges; and 
• Holistic-based on a full understanding of ecological dynamics. 
Widespread adoption of dynamic, clear, preventative, adaptive, 
and holistic policies will stimulate much important scientific activity. 
Good policy is based on an understanding of the links between eco-
logical and economic dynamics. Such policies give impetus to science 
by facilitating the asking of different and important questions. 
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For example, Stirling and Gee point out that precautionary poli-
cies, where adopted, have led to: (1) increased research and monitor-
ing of environmental change and its relationship to public and ecosys-
tem health; (2) research into a wider range of mechanisms of environ-
mental degradation and a need for multi-disciplinary approaches to 
understanding effects; (3) increased participation in science based pol-
icymaking, including a broadened definition of who is considered an 
interested and affected party; (4) the development of potential substi-
tutes for environmentally destructive activities and substances; and (5) 
the development of whole new fields of risk reduction technologies 
such as "green chemistry. "5 
Massachusetts's Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA) , is an example 
of these policies.6 The law created a Toxics Use Reduction Institute 
and an Office of Technical Assistance to assist industry to discover 
ways to reduce its use of toxic substances. 
II. MANIFESTATIONS OF POLICY 
A. Precautionary Principle 
At the conclusion of the 1992 World Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro, widely known as the Earth Sum-
mit, the world's governments adopted the Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Developme~t. It states that, "[w]here there are threats 
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to pre-
vent environmental degradation." In the decade since the Earth 
Summit there has been considerable discussion of the meaning of the 
so-called precautionary principle and its implications for environ-
mental law, policy, and science. 
The principle recognizes two key features of ecosystem dynamics. 
First, the complex interactions that characterize ecosystems in the real 
world often make it almost impossible to establish with scientific cer-
tainty cause and effect relationships between a given activity or sub-
stance and a decline in environmental health or integrity. Second, the 
same limitations on our understanding of ecosystem dynamics and 
the extreme difficulty and high costs of repairing or restoring de-
5 See Andy Stirling & David Gee, Science, Precaution, and Practice, 117 PUB. HEAL TIl REP. 
521,526-28 (2002). 
6 See, e.g., Brian Mayer et aI., Moving Further Upstream: From Toxics Reduction to the Precau-
tionary Principle, 117 PUB. HEAL TIl REP. 574, 574-86 (2002). 
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graded ecosystems make many kinds of environmental damage essen-
tially irreversible. The term "precautionary principle" "came into Eng-
lish a·s a translation of the German word Vorsorgeprinzip. An alternative 
translation might have been 'foresight principle' which has the advan-
tage of emphasizing anticipatory action .... "7 
The Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative offers an example of how 
the precautionary principle works. The Initiative involved reaching 
agreement among the environmental regulatory agencies from all 
eight of the Great Lakes states on adopting consistent water quality 
standards for persistent bioaccumulative toxic substances in the Great 
Lakes. Certain substances, known as Tier 1 chemicals, would be strin-
gently regulated. Industry representatives argued that a chemical 
should not be placed on Tier 1 until its toxicity was proven. Environ-
mental activists insisted that any compound whose structure and activity 
suggested that it might bioaccumulate and concentrate as it passed up 
the food chain or was persistent and potentially toxic should be listed 
in Tier 1 until the industries that produced or released the compound 
showed convincingly that it was harmless. This, they argued, would give 
industry a clear incentive to carry out the toxicological research 
needed to demonstrate a chemical's effects in the environment. The 
environmentalists pointed out that the current system of chemical 
regulation required months, and sometimes years, to act on a single 
compound; during the same time industry was producing and market-
ing hundreds of new compounds that would inevitably be released into 
the environment with unknown results. It changes the economic incen-
tives for those who introduce new chemicals or technologies. Prior to 
application of the precautionary principle industries had an interest in 
avoiding knowledge of the broader implications of their actions out of 
fear that the more information, the greater the chance of discovering 
something that might trigger regulation. Under precautionary policies, 
they would have an incentive to gather as much information as possible 
to demonstrate the safety of what they propose. Thus, there is a system-
atic incentive to increase information and understanding. 
By shifting the onus of proof of harm from government to indus-
try, precaution can reorient publicly-funded research toward a broader 
interdisciplinary effort to learn how to redesign the technologies of 
economic life to make them more compatible with, and less disruptive 
7 David Kriebel et al.. The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science, 109 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 871. 871 (2001). 
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to, the complex relationships and cycles of natural systems. As Kriebel 
and Tickner argued before a congressional hearing: 
Precaution demands more rigorous science to characterize 
complex risks, clarifY gaps in knowledge, and identifY early 
warnings. Application of precaution means using science not 
only for diagnosis of environmental hazards, but also to effec-
tively identifY and develop policy options that can reduce risks 
and drive innovation towards safer and cleaner materials. 8 
The current system of regulations focuses the scientific commu-
nity on becoming ever more precise in characterizing risks and defin-
ing problems. Switching to a focus on prevention refocuses science on 
identifying solutions and providing alternative but less inherently dis-
ruptive means of achieving the same economic ends. This can stimu-
late economic activity in the search for cleaner and safer alternatives. 
It expands the kinds of questions that get asked, encourages tinkering 
and innovative problem-solving, all of which are positive for the de-
velopment of creative, socially useful science. 
The continual need to improve the characterization of known risks 
leads science to focus on those chemicals and activities that are already 
known to be harmful. For example, in the Great Lakes, the environ-
mental sciences tend to focus on the eleven so-called "priority pollut-
ants." These pollutants were designated as priorities in the 1970s by the 
Science Advisory Board of the Canada-U.S. International Joint Com-
mission, the international organization that oversees management of 
the boundary waters, including the Great Lakes ecosystem. Substances 
were selected for the list because: (1) they had been measured in the 
water in the Great Lakes; and (2) they were known to be harmful. IT, 
therefore, a substance was found but its effects were unknown, or if a 
substance was known to be harmful but had not yet been measured, it 
would not be considered a priority. Such a prioritization makes sense 
for efficiently allocating resources for regulation and cleanup but it 
makes no sense for science. Yet, for nearly three decades, scientists have 
been encouraged by the flow of funding to continue to study the prior-
ity pollutan ts in order to characterize the risks they pose and to justifY 
the costs of regulation and remediation. According to Kriebel and 
Tickner, this pattern of funding leads to "a strong tendency towards 
8 David Kriebel & Joel A. Tickner, Testimony at Congressional Briefing on Science and 
Precaution in Environmental and Public Health Policy (July 24, 2003) (on file with au-
thor). 
614 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 31:607 
research within narrow disciplinary boundaries rather than interdisci-
plinary research on such challenges as the lifelong cumulative effects of 
hazardous exposure, or the combined effects of simultaneous expo-
sures to several chemicals at once. "9 
B. Adaptive Management 
Much like the precautionary principle, adaptive management as a 
paradigm for environmental policy is based on the recognition that our 
scientific understanding of complex systems is incomplete. But that 
should not encourage inaction. lO Like the precautionary principle, it 
looks to law and policy to lead science rather than be led by it. While 
debates about the precautionary principle usually focus on potentially 
harmful chemicals and new technologies like genetic engineering, 
adaptive management is a term more often heard in the world of wild-
life conservation, endangered species protection and resource man-
agement in general. Where traditional natural resource law and poli-
cies focus on the harvest or mining of products, management focuses 
on protection and sustainability of the ecosystems within which such 
products are harvested. The impact on science is to change the ques-
tions from how to capture or harvest or mine, to how to cultivate and 
sustain. These are broader, harder questions, less likely to be under-
taken by the industries that mine and harvest. ll 
Kai Lee, whose book The Compass and the Gyroscope did much to 
popularize the notion of adaptive management, talks about it as "im-
plementing policies as experiments. "12 The idea is that even though 
we don't know enough about ecosystems to be certain of the out-
comes of our management actions, we still need to act to prevent de-
clining ecological conditions. Under these circumstances, we need to 
act based on our best understanding of ecosystem dynamics, continu-
ally monitor and be flexible and prepare to change the degree of di-
rection of our interventions as a result of changing conditions. He 
argues that such an approach "promotes learning to high priority in 
91d. 
10 See generally ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. 
Holling ed., 1978); Carl Walters, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RESOURCES 
(1986). Both sources offer in depth descriptions of how adaptive management has taken 
account of our incomplete understanding of scientific complexity. 
11 See Kai N. Lee, Appraising Adaptive Management, 3 CONSERVATION ECOLOGY 3 (Sept. 
8, 1999), at http://www.consecoI.org/voI3/iss2/art3. 
121d. 
2004] Ecological Dynamics of Environmental Law and Policy 615 
stewardship, "13 clearly a boost for science, requiring a real collabora-
tion between the social and natural sciences. Much emphasis is placed 
on the development of measurable criteria and indicators to inform 
management over time. Such criteria and indicators are "information 
tools in the service of forest management" in the sense that they "can 
be used to conceptualize, evaluate, implement and communicate sus-
tainable forest management."14 
C. Ecosystem Management 
The Ecological Society of America defines ecosystem manage-
mentas: 
[M]anagement driven by explicit goals, executed by policies, 
protocols, and practices, and made adaptable by monitoring 
and research based on our best understanding of the eco-
logical interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosys-
tem composition, structure, and function .... Sustain ability 
must be the primary objective, and levels of commodity and 
amenity provisions adjusted to meet that goal.15 
Like the other management paradigms discussed here, ecosystem man-
agement adopts ecosystem health, integrity, or sustain ability as the pri-
mary management goal while expecting human economic activities to 
be redesigned to be as harmonious with natural flows and cycles as pos-
sible. This expectation directs science toward producing the knowledge 
needed for this kind of engineering. Such knowledge is expected to be 
derived from both social and natural sciences exploring the dynamics 
of the interface between ecology and economy. 
CONCLUSION 
Each of these management paradigms-precaution, adaptive 
management, and ecosystem management-are reactive, having arisen 
in response to a critique of standard practice in environmental law and 
15Id. 
14 Ravi Prabhu et a!., Between Voodoo Science and Adaptive Management: The Role and Re-
search Needs for Indicators of Sustainable Forest Management, in CRITERIA AND INDICATORS FOR 
SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT 40, 41 (R. John Raison ed., 2001). 
15 HANNAJ. CORTNER & MARGARET A. MOOTE, THE POLITICS OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGE-
MENT 41 (1999) (citing Christensen et a!., The Report of the Ecological Society of America Com-
mittee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665, 682 
(1996». 
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policy. The precautionary principle responds to the apparent reckless-
ness of permitting the continuation of actions whose environmental 
impacts are potentially large and irreversible because of a lack of sci-
entific certainty about the scope and nature of those risks. Adaptive 
management responds to the typical lack of ongoing monitoring and 
assessment about the impacts of conservation actions. Ecosystem man-
agement responds to the tendency to manage parts of an ecosystem or 
individual species while ignoring the dynamic system of ecological rela-
tionships that shape and sustain the individual components. Each 
forces scientists to ask broader questions, to engage in systems thinking. 
This can only be good for environmental science in general. 
